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ABSTRACT 
Since 2001, the West has focused on the insurgency along the Afghan-Pakistani border. 
The minimal achievements of Pakistan’s counterinsurgency operations drew U.S. 
scrutiny. Skeptics accused Pakistan of not being serious about eliminating Islamic 
militants. Pakistan has opposed, supported, or ignored Islamic militant groups. Both 
domestic and transnational issues complicate Islamabad’s decision-making ability. This 
thesis evaluates to what extent India, Islamic affinity, and Pashtun nationalism shaped 
Pakistan’s counterinsurgency strategy. The perceived existential Indian threat creates a 
security dilemma for the Pakistani military. Pakistan lacks the capacity to fight a two-
front war without international assistance. Islamabad’s instrumental use of Islamic groups 
to achieve political and strategic objectives allows Islamist to become intertwined with 
the state. Strategic successes of the military-militant nexus created deep-rooted 
sympathies toward Islamic militants that make implementing counterinsurgency policies 
problematic. Fearing Pashtun nationalism, the Pakistan army’s deployment in the region 
was minimal, and instead, Pashtun tribal leaders were unprotected against radical 
elements. The Mullahs’ growing strength upset the balance of authority within the tribal 
governance system. The spread of radical fundamentalism outside the FATA region 
forced Islamabad to react. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A.  MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1 
B.  IMPORTANCE ................................................................................................1 
C.  PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES ...............................................................2 
D.  LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4 
E.  METHODS AND SOURCES ..........................................................................8 
F.  THESIS OVERVIEW ...................................................................................10 
II.  IS INDIA A CREDIBLE THREAT? .......................................................................11 
A.  INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................11 
B.  OPPOSING ARMIES ....................................................................................11 
1.  Conventional Forces in Comparison ................................................11 
2.  Marginalized Paramilitary Force .....................................................14 
3.  Pakistani Armies Conventional Training ........................................14 
C.  MILITARY EXPENDITURES. ...................................................................16 
D.  HONORING THE CONVENTIONAL THREAT .....................................19 
E.  WILL WASHINGTON ABANDON PAKISTAN? ....................................22 
F.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................24 
III.  A SELECTIVE ISLAMIC AFFINITY ....................................................................27 
A.  INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................27 
B.  JIHADI RHETORIC .....................................................................................27 
C.  PROSCRIBING MILITANT GROUPS ......................................................30 
D.  POLITICAL COLLUSION ..........................................................................32 
E.  THE MILITARY IS NOT MONOLITHIC ................................................34 
F.  ISLAMIC GROUPS CHALLENGE THE STATE ....................................36 
G.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................37 
IV.  PASHTUN NATIONALISM POST-9/11 ................................................................39 
A.  INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................39 
B.  WHO ARE THE PASHTUNS? ....................................................................39 
C.  WHAT IT IS PASHTUN NATIONALISM? ...............................................42 
1.  Durand Line .......................................................................................42 
2.  Pashtunistan .......................................................................................44 
3.  Afghan Factor .....................................................................................45 
D.  FAILED GOVERNANCE.............................................................................46 




A.  AN INDIAN NEIGHBOR .............................................................................53 
B.  ISLAMIC AFFINITY ....................................................................................54 
C.  PASHTUN NATIONALISM ........................................................................55 
 viii
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................59 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  Pakistan Army’s Corps Peacetime Positions. ..................................................13 
Figure 2.  Indian Army’s Corps Peacetime Positions. .....................................................13 
Figure 3.  Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Regions .............................................................43 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.  Indian and Pakistan Military Expenditure .......................................................17 
Table 2.  Indian and Pakistan Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ......................................18 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CAR  Central Asian Republics 
CFL  Cease Fire Line 
CI   Counterinsurgency 
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency 
CSF  Coalition Support Funds 
FATA  Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FCR  Frontier Crime Regulations 
GDP   Gross National Product 
IJI  Islami Jamhoori Itihad  
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force 
ISI  Inter-Service Intelligence 
JAH  Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith 
JI   Jamiat e-Islami 
JKLF  Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 
JUI  Jamiat Ulema e-Islam 
JUP  Jamiat Ulema-I-Pakistan 
KKM  Khudia Khidmatgar Movement 
LOC  Line of Control 
LEJ  Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 
LET  Lashkar-e-Taiba 
MMA  Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NPT  Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
PATA  Provincially Administered Tribal Areas 
PML  Pakistani Muslim League 
OIF  Operation Iraqi Freedom 
SIPRI  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
TTP   Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan 
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 xv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank my father, Charles Lowe, for his support, dialogue, and 
guidance throughout my studies at Naval Postgraduate School. A special thanks to Dr. S. 
Paul Kapur and Anshu N. Chatterjee for their valuable insight. Without them, this project 
would have lacked the deep background needed to understand the regional dynamics. I 
would like to extend my gratitude to my thesis advisor, Dr. Tristan James Mabry, for his 
patience, guidance, and attention to detail throughout this project. Additionally, Brigadier 
Feroz Hassan Khan, my second reader, was extremely insightful throughout my studies. 
His candid objective position toward Pakistan inspired this project. 
 xvi












A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Pakistan has been using Islamic militant groups as a foreign policy tool against 
Afghanistan and India over the past sixty years; however, the events of 9/11 created a 
paradigm shift on the way Pakistan dealt with such groups. The context in which militant 
groups operating within Pakistan has been affected by Islamabad’s enhanced friendship 
with Washington. With over 24 different domestic and transnational militant groups 
identified within Pakistan, the Pakistani government has supported, ignored, or opposed 
militant groups. With multiple militant groups with varying objectives operating within 
Pakistan, it would take considerable research to answer that problem in its entirety. 
Isolating the problem to a particular region narrows the focus of the overall problem. The 
research is concentrated on the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which harbors the greatest 
population of Islamic militant groups oriented toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Although President Musharraf quickly joined the United States’ “War on Terror,” 
Pakistan has been reluctant to conduct counterinsurgency operations to stymie cross-
border militant activity along the Afghan-Pakistani border, which has increased U.S. 
skepticism toward Pakistan. Pakistan has been placed in a precarious position by 
garnering substantial aid from the United States in exchange for assistance in building 
Afghan security. Thus, Islamabad must appease Washington, but at the same time 
maintain domestic order and ensure state security.    Pakistan has the seventh largest 
military in the world, but Pakistan has not eliminated militant groups.  Instead, they have 
conducted minimal military operations from 2001–2008 against militants groups.  In this 
thesis, I intended to demonstrate to what extend the state’s Islamic ideological affinities, 
India, and Pashtun nationalism have shaped Pakistan’s counterinsurgency strategy in the 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province from 2001–2008. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
Washington’s policies regarding the “War on Terror” have direct consequences to 
Pakistan. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan has exacerbated tensions along the Af-Pak 
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border particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region. An 
antiquated governance system left in place from the British rule has permitted the 
territory to be a safe haven for Islamic militant groups that are interfering with U.S. state-
building operations in Afghanistan and challenging the writ of the Pakistani government. 
Washington’s increasing pressure on Islamabad to act against cross border attacks has 
had varying success; therefore, a greater understanding of the security calculations that 
Pakistan is facing will assist U.S. policy makers to understand Islamabad’s capacity and 
aspirations in regards to militant groups. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
As India plays a dominating role in Pakistan’s strategic calculation, to what extent 
has Islamabad’s counterinsurgency strategy in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa been affected?  
The existential threat of India toward Pakistan is a deep-rooted fear inscribed from 
partition. Both South Asian countries have troops deployed in close proximity to their 
shared borders, and although President Musharraf has sought to normalize relations with 
New Delhi, the closeness and cold start strategy ensures India remains a constant in 
Pakistan’s security calculation. New Delhi’s collaboration with Kabul has heightened 
Pakistani concerns. Although Pakistan would prosper from Afghan domestic stability, the 
threat of a pro-Indian regime in Kabul is troublesome as it could threaten Pakistan’s 
existence with a two-front dilemma. While Pakistan has always relied on the United 
States to intervene on Indo-Pakistan hostilities, the Bush administration’s pro-Indian 
foreign policy has alarmed Islamabad. Without minimizing India’s threatening stature 
either through normalization or assurance from the United States, Pakistan will continue 
to do the minimum toward counterinsurgency in along its western border. 
To what extent have Islamic ideological affinities shaped counterinsurgency 
strategy in the western regions?  Pakistani military has used jihad rhetoric to mobilize 
‘freedom fighters’ in Afghanistan and India as a proxy force to assist in achieving 
strategic victories by maintaining minimal state association. The Islamic nature of the 
state creates natural assumptions that the state supports Islamic militant groups operating 
within the state. The Military and ISI’s ties with militant groups and the period of 
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Islamization by General Zia al-Huq contribute to this assumption.   Although the 
Pakistani military is predominately Muslim, similar to the United States being primarily 
Christian, military leaders maintain secular views by weeding out leaders with radical 
affinities. President Musharraf’s proscribing of militant groups and assassination attempts 
against him positively argues that Islamic militant groups have become unpopularity 
within the military and state. Although the state and military has been linked to Islamic 
militant groups in the past, the state and military have made considerable efforts to 
disassociate themselves from sectarian ideologies, but maintain links as a security 
calculation against India. 
To what extent has Pashtun nationalism shaped counterinsurgency strategy in the 
in the western regions?  Throughout Pakistan’s past, Islamabad has been challenged with 
separatist movements and continues to endure an unresolved situation next door in 
Baluchistan. The FATA region is inhabited by the largest tribal society in the world.   
The Pashtun tribes straddle both sides of the Durand line that is governed by the Frontier 
Crime regulations (FCR)—an outdated governing system left over from the British in 
1901—that allows for tribes to maintain a semi-autonomous relationship with the 
Pakistani central government.  Since partition, a separate Pashtun state has been solicited 
by Afghanistan to rejoin the Afghan and Pakistani tribes together. Afghan regimes have 
further agitated the situation by advocating for a rejoining of tribal territories at the 
expense of Pakistan.   Islamabad has become obsessively concerned with its territory 
after the secession of East Pakistan. The Pashtun tribal society has a strong cohesive 
ability. Pakistan military has intervened in the tribal areas with regular forces and the 
frontier corps with limited success. The frontier corps comprised of tribal Pashtuns 
disintegrated in military operations while regular forces faced substantial tribal lashkars. 
The Pakistani military must be sensitive to a population centric strategy that identifies 
them as an occupier, which could aggravate a dormant separatist movement or face a 
united tribal society.    
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The U.S. invasion into Pakistan in October of 2001, and subsequent occupation 
drove a majority of the insurgents across the border into Pakistan. The ungoverned 
territories of the FATA region provided sanctuary for insurgents to reorganize and launch 
offensive operations into Afghanistan against the International Security Assistance 
Forces (ISAF). Pakistan’s participation in the “war on terror” was an absolute 
requirement to avoid the wrath of the United States after 9/11. Although the alliance with 
the United States to weed out Al Qaeda members has been successful, Pakistan has been 
unsuccessful to inhibit the Afghan Taliban and affiliated groups from conducting cross-
border attacks. Why has Pakistan the seventh largest army in the world been unable 
adequate stymie insurgent operations?  To answer that question the purpose of this 
research is to understand what has shaped Pakistan’s counterinsurgency strategy in the 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa from 2001–2008.           
With India aiding state building in Afghanistan, the existential Indian threat to 
Pakistan now exists on two fronts. As Feroz Khan explains, Pakistan fears a “strategic 
envelopment” by India, in which would cause political and security problems for 
Pakistan.1  Christine Fair points out; Pakistan has been supporting Afghan Taliban, 
Haqqani network, and even groups such as LeT to undermine India’s position in 
Afghanistan.2  Islamabad sees the Delhi-Kabul relationship as a zero-sum game with 
Islamabad that may have dire consequences for Pakistan. Two main issues are centered 
on the Durand Line that Kabul does not accept internationally and a reawakening of the 
Pashtunistan secessionist movement. Pakistan is concerned that India may be the catalyst 
that reignites these past grievances, which would undermine Pakistan’s domestic and 
international status. As New Delhi and Islamabad attempt to normalize relations, 
Pakistani leaders face the difficulty of reigning in militants. Militants of the Jihadi 
                                                 
1 Feroz Hassan Khan, “Rough Neighbors: Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Strategic Insight 2, January 
2003.  
2 C. Christine Fair, “Under the Shrinking U.S. Security Umbrella: India’s End Game in Afghanistan,” 
The Washington Quarterly 34 (2011), 181.  
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organizations are highly motivated, which makes it difficult to change their mindset since 
many know no other vocation besides ‘the jihad.’3 
Washington’s policies and attention toward Afghanistan and Pakistan over the 
past years has drawn scrutiny. Rashid discusses how the lack of U.S. military presence in 
Afghanistan and failure to acknowledge Musharraf’s double game fostered a benevolent 
attitude toward thwarting militant activity.4  Additionally, the Bush administration did not 
question Musharraf about FATA’s status as along as the Pakistan army and ISI 
cooperated with the principal U.S. aims of capturing Al-Qaeda leaders.5  The effects of 
possible U.S. abandonment are central to the arguments for Pakistan supporting militant 
groups. As Zahid Hussain states, the Pakistani military believes a renewed Afghan civil 
war will break out when U.S. troops leave.6  Mohan Malik argues that the Pakistani 
Military is apprehensive to dismantle the Al Qaeda terrorist infrastructure for fear that 
Pakistan’s importance would be devalued within U.S. security strategy.7 Additionally, the 
reliance of U.S. financial and military aid has forced Islamabad into a dilemma that by 
following U.S. dictation and engaging militant groups could create a Pakistani civil war. 
Pamela Constable describes U.S.-Pakistan relationship as a love-hate relationship since 
many Pakistani’s view the United States as manipulative superpower that has supported 
repressive rulers and has a hatred of Muslims.8  
Military campaigns in FATA have been documented to provide a relatively 
complete sequence of events that give insight to failures and successes of the Pakistani 
army. The lack of a comprehensive and integrated counter-terrorism strategy has become 
                                                 
3 Riaz Mohammad Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to 
Modernity (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2011), 257. 
4 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New York: 
Penguin Group, 2009), 228. 
5 Ibid., 237. 
6 Zahid Hussain, “Battling Militancy,” in Pakistan beyond the ‘Crisis State,’ ed. Maleeha Lodhi (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 202.  
7 Mohan Malik, “The Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The Clash between State and 
Antistate Actors,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 30 (2003): 189. 
8 Pamela Constable, Playing with Fire: Pakistan at War with Itself (New York: Random House, 2011), 
238   
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a major problem dealing with rising militancy.9  In evaluating Pakistan’s offensives in 
Swat and FATA, Daud Khattak summarized that an ineffective counterinsurgency 
strategy has allowed for militant groups to regain influence, and that civilians have been 
alienated due to inadequate rebuilding phases.10  To mitigate militant violence throughout 
Pakistan and against Pakistani military, peace deals were brokered. Zahid Hussain argues 
that policies of appeasement over the past decade have allowed the militant groups to 
gain control of FATA and surrounding areas.11 Riaz Mohammad Khan agrees that peace 
deals have emboldened militants and undermine the government’s authority.12  Although 
the appeasement had short-term conflict resolution, why did the Pakistani military offer 
peace deals when in the longer term the peace deals undermined the central governments 
regional power? 
Selective action by the Pakistani state and army has been taken against particular 
groups of Islamist terrorists, particularly those who have turned against the state.13 What 
Mohan Malik calls anti-state actors?  Musharraf’s post 9/11 proscribing of militant 
groups and the Red Mosque are the main watershed events that have turned groups 
against the state. Militant groups began to challenge the government and the 
sociopolitical system creating conditions for a possible civil war.14  The consequences of 
mishandling the Red Mosque siege swayed the TTP and Al Qaeda to declare war against 
the Pakistan.15  Lieven agrees that the military’s attitude toward militant groups changed 
once specific groups became direct threats to Pakistan.16           
                                                 
9 Hussain, “Battling Militancy,” 147. 
10 Daud Khattak, “Evaluating Pakistan’s Offensives in Swat and FATA,” CTC Sentinel 4 (2011): 11. 
11 Hussain, “Battling Militancy,” 146. 
12 Khan, “Rough Neighbors,” 228.  
13 Ajai Sahni, “The War on Terror: Assessing U.S. Policy Alternatives on Pakistan,” Faultlines 18, 
2007. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume18/article1.htm 
14 Khan, 257. 
15 Ziad Haider, “Ideologically Adrift,” in Pakistan beyond the ‘Crisis State’, ed. Maleeha Lodhi (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 138. 
16 Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country, Pakistan: A Hard Country (New York: Public Affairs, 
2011): 175. 
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Husain Haqqani states that the radical and violent manifestations of Islamist 
ideology can be interpreted as a state project gone awry.17  The linkage of Islam and 
Pakistan is explicitly tied to the state. Haqqani continues to elaborate that Islamic 
ideology is closely linked to Pakistan’s military and the Worldview of Political elites.18   
Imtiaz Gul agrees that Islamic ideology is used to promote of political agendas19 while 
Daniel Markey believes that Pakistan security services maintain connections with Islamic 
militants less out of ideological sympathy and more out of strategic calculation to hedge 
against abandonment by the United States.20  Islamic militants directly tie Islamic 
ideology to their agenda. Additionally, evidence suggests that collusion between the 
Pakistani military, Musharraf, and Islamist politicians bolster political power by 
alienating secular parties. Although Islamic militant groups, Al Qaeda, and the state share 
Islamic beliefs, does that affinity create sympathy toward certain groups from the 
Pakistani military and Political elites?  
The Pashtun tribes have been an autonomous tribal society since the seventeenth 
century.   Under the British, the Durand line was formed to create a buffer state between 
British India and Russia, and divided the Pashtun tribal areas. The tribes never paid 
attention to this imaginary line and crossed back and forth freely without fear of 
retribution. The partition of India and Pakistan allowed for the bid of an independent state 
called Pashtunistan to reunite the tribal areas. There is a prevalent amount of literature 
that describes the events that carved out the unsuccessful bid for an independent state by 
Ghaffar Khan.   With a majority of the Afghan population Pashtun, subsequent Afghan 
regimes have attempted to incorporate the Pashtun tribal areas form Pakistan. Pakistan 
initially supported the Taliban to establish an Islamabad friendly regime in Kabul and put 
an end to Pashtunistan. There is minimal literature on the Pashtun separatist movement in 
Pakistan in context to the Pakistani government counterinsurgency operations. Adeel 
Khan contends that Pashtun nationalist have little sympathy for the Taliban since Pashtun 
                                                 
17 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 317. 
18 Ibid., 312 
19 Imtiaz Gul, The Most Dangerous Place (New York: Penguin Group, 2010), 35. 
20 Markey, 7. 
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nationalists have become integrated into the Pakistani state and their main concern is 
based on power instead of ethnicity.21  Nasreen Ghufran argues that the Taliban 
insurgency is not based on Pashtun nationalism, but on Islamic interpretations with 
Pashtun’s being mobilized by their Islamic religious identity.22   Conrad Schetter 
evaluates the movement as a conflict between the Pakistani state and tribe based on 
ethno-nationalistic ideas while Robert Kaplan argues that the Taliban constitutes the 
latest manifestation of Pashtun nationalism.23      
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
A Qualitative study using secondary resources will be used to demonstrate what 
shaped Pakistan’s counterinsurgency (CI) strategy in the NWFP between 2001 and 2008.  
Specifically, I will look at how Islamic ideological affinities, India as a security threat, 
and Pashtun Nationalism has shaped their strategy. The intention of this thesis is to 
determine to what extent these factors have shaped CI, and does not imply other casual 
factors do not exist. The timeframe has been chosen to isolate events after 9/11 when the 
context of international community changed with regards to transnational terrorism, and 
maintains a constant regime in both Pakistan and the United States; therefore minimizing 
the effects of policy changes in subsequent administrations. Although confined to an 
eight-year window, historical research will be conducted to demonstrate how past 
policies have shaped contemporary attitudes.            
The Indo-Pakistani security competition is an enduring calculus shaped by the 
development and structure of state system within the subcontinent. A review of Pakistani 
concerns regarding its counterinsurgency strategy will begin by comparing each army’s 
organization structure and static base locations to demonstrate the geostrategic issues. 
Second, a discussion on how Pakistani tactics are fixed by conventional warfare directed 
toward India. Third, a review of Pakistani troop movements in relation to Indian army 
                                                 
21 Adeel Khan, “Pashtun Ethnic Nationalism: From Separation to Integration,” Asian Ethnicity 4 
(2003): 17. 
 22 See Nasreen Ghufran, “Pushtun Ethnonationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the NorthWest 
Frontier Province of Pakistan,” Asian Survey 49 (2009): 1092–1114. 
23 Robert Kaplan, “The Revenge of Geography,” Foreign Policy 172 (2009): 96. 
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mobilization to demonstrate the reactionary nature of the Pakistani army towards Indian 
aggression. Third, Pakistan fears U.S. abandonment of Afghanistan, and foresees a 
similar situation as in 1989; therefore, a discussion on how Washington’s resolve on 
Afghanistan have altered Pakistan’s position. Lastly, a review of Pakistan’s military 
expenditure to determine if the state’s financial capacity is able to support security 
operations on two fronts.  
The effects Pashtun nationalism on Islamabad’s decision making process will 
begin with describing Pashtun tribal society and center-state relations between Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa and Islamabad. Next, past Pashtun separatist movements will be addressed 
to establish the rationality for Pakistan’s concerns. A comparison to the Siege of 
Malakand in 1897 will be used to illustrate the Mullahs mobilizing abilities. A review of 
the Maliki system and how the growing power of mullahs has intertwined and radicalized 
the Islamic Pashtun identity to establish concerns on military intervention. Lastly, this 
thesis will illustrate the deterioration of tribal governance and the spread of 
Talibanization.  
The State’s and military Islamic ideology affinity became radicalized under 
General Zia ul-Haq’s regime; therefore, his regime will be used to establish the 
underlying basis for the affinity, and how the military used jihad rhetoric to mobilize 
militant groups to act as proxies against the Soviets in the 1980s. Addressing specific 
events such as Red Mosque incident, military’s removal of Islamic fanatics within the 
higher echelons, Madrassa reform, President Musharraf’s anti-militant policies will be 
used to demonstrate how the Mullah-Military nexus has been de-hyphenated.   President 
Musharraf’s collusion with the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), and how he used 
Islamic political parties to bolster his political agenda will be used to demonstrate how 
power politics and political manipulation have shaped CI strategies.   Lastly, a review of 
peace deals between the state and Islamic militant groups to demonstrate that other 
factors besides Islamic affinities created a need to sue for peace instead continuing 
military attacks. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Organization of the thesis will be broken down into five sections. The first chapter 
will be the introduction that describes the major research question, importance, problems, 
and hypothesis. The second chapter will compare Pakistan’s security capacity to India’s 
capacity. The third chapter will review the Pashtun nationalism problem and how 
Islamabad’s relationship with the Pashtun tribal society has shaped the Pakistani’s 
counterinsurgency strategy. The fourth chapter will analyze the Mullah-Military nexus to 
illustrate the pragmatic issues that this relationship has on counterinsurgency operations. 
Lastly, the fifth chapter will be the conclusion. 
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II. IS INDIA A CREDIBLE THREAT? 
A. INTRODUCTION. 
In this chapter, I show to what extent the Indian military along the Pakistani 
eastern border has affected Pakistan’s troop employment and weapons procurement     
vis-à-vis counterinsurgency. The existential threat of India has primacy in Pakistani 
security calculations, and planners emphasize protection against any potential Indian 
aggression.  Although Pakistan recognizes the insurgent threat along its western borders, 
security managers balance force and resource allocations to ensure security is not 
jeopardized on either front.  At the same time, Pakistan must be confident that the United 
States’ resolve in the region will be steadfast in order to minimize fears of possible U.S. 
abandonment, which would leave Pakistan vulnerable to an Indian regional hegemony.   
B. OPPOSING ARMIES 
1. Conventional Forces in Comparison 
The Pakistan military is the strongest institution of the state and the primacy of 
the Indian threat dominates Pakistan’s focus. At times, the Pakistani political leadership 
calls upon the military to stifle domestic conflict, but typically the military focuses on the 
eastern and western borders with the greater emphasis to the former. The communal 
violence of partition, India’s early assertions of abrogating partition, and the unfinished 
business of Kashmir shaped this geographic predisposition. The conventional force 
strength of Pakistan is numerically disadvantaged relative to India. This disadvantage 
hampers Pakistani military planners from using regular forces in western Pakistan. 
Pakistan’s ‘all volunteer’ force is comprised of 550,000 regular service members 
with an additional half million reserve that are principally posted at strategic bases 
mirroring Indian garrisons along the Indo-Pakistani border.   The traditional force 
structure is influenced by Western, Soviet, and Chinese military weapon systems and 
doctrines that are oriented toward conventional war. It has nine corps composed of armor, 
mechanized infantry, and independent infantry along with supporting arms units. The 
preponderance of these units are strategically positioned to serve as holding and strike 
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elements for a possible Indian offensive into the Punjab plain (see Figure 1). Two corps 
serve as tactical reserves in the event of an Indo-Pakistan conflict, but chiefly serve as the 
primary security forces for Baluchistan and Kyhber Pakhtunkhwa provinces (see 
Figure 1). 
On the opposite side of the border, Pakistan faces the third largest standing army 
in the world with 1.3 million regular service members and one million reserve personnel, 
which is only exceeded by the United States and China.  Additionally, India’s 
paramilitary component is similar in size to the regular army, thereby, creating a potential 
adversarial army of over 3.5 million combatants. Born from the same colonial military 
establishment, India’s force structure compares similarly to the Pakistani armed forces, 
although numerically advantaged. External and internal military industrial complexes 
supply the Indian Army to maintain a modern and technologically competitive 
mechanized force.24  The organizational structure of the Indian Army has six field 
commands comprised of 13 infantry corps with 10 corps oriented toward Pakistan (see 
Figure 2). More importantly, India has an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 Indian troops 
actively deployed in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. Even with nuclear 
deterrence, the numerically advantaged conventional force in close proximity to the Indo-
Pakistan border renders a substantial looming threat that Pakistani security planners must 
take into account. 
                                                 
24 Radhakrisha Rao, “Need for an Indian Military Industrail Complex,” Institute of Peace and Conflict 
Studies, 26 April, 2010. 
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Figure 1.   Pakistan Army’s Corps Peacetime Positions.25  
 
Figure 2.   Indian Army’s Corps Peacetime Positions.26 
                                                 
25 See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/army-orbat-corps-aor.htm. 
26 See http://brfrahulm.blogspot.com/2011/05/indian-army-corps-geographical-commands.html. 
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2. Marginalized Paramilitary Force 
The use of marginalized paramilitary force is problematic in curtailing the 
domestic insurgency threat. Pakistan relies on the Frontier Corps to maintain security 
within its western territories. Both Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have separate 
provincial Frontier Corps, and are the primary force used against militants within 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).27  The Frontier Corps is marginalized by 
regular forces in training, equipment, and leadership, which has greatly affected their 
effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations. Senior command positions are reserved for 
regular army officers. The low prestige of these positions makes these billets undesirable 
for career-minded officers, thereby, limiting high quality leadership.28  Local Pashtun 
recruits fill a majority of the lower ranks. Their local knowledge of the natural and human 
terrain, language, and kinship gives the military a resource to counter the insurgent’s 
popular advantage, but tribal loyalties and kinship make soldiers susceptible to insurgent 
coercion against families. 
3. Pakistani Armies Conventional Training 
The training of Pakistan’s army is shaped by the Indian threat. The perceived 
existential threat of India toward Pakistan has dominated Rawalpindi’s security 
calculation over the past six decades. The majority of the Pakistani army remains trained 
and outfitted to engage a conventional war against India. Pakistan uses conventional 
tactics against the insurgents.  This approach strained the indigenous population by 
displacing nearly two million people attempting to escape the violence. The use of 
conventional tactics against Islamic militant groups exacerbates the insurgency problem 
along the western border of Pakistan. These strains benefit the insurgents as the people 
lose confidence in their government. Insurgents goad the military into tactics that are self-
                                                 
27 Hassan Abbas, “Transforming Pakistan’s Frontier Corps,” Terrorism Monitor 5, March 30, 2007.  
28 Joshua T. White, “Applying Counterinsurgency Principles in Pakistan’s Frontier,” The Brookings 
Institution, Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series, No. 2, June 25, 2009. 
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defeating. The enemy provokes the military into an overreacting behavior with scant 
discrimination, which contributes to reducing the legitimacy of central authority.29 
The use of a direct military approach in counterinsurgency operations represents 
the leadership’s parochial mindset towards conventional warfare. U.S. Joint Chief of 
Staff, Admiral Michael Mullin, offered to provide U.S. military training to Pakistan’s 
regular military forces, but the offer was not accepted by Pakistan’s army chief.30 
General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani ascertained that the army’s principal mission is to remain 
deployed along the eastern border to counter possible conflicts with their traditional 
enemy of India.31  Instead, the army relied on the tribal militias and the Frontier Corps to 
conduct counterinsurgency operations. This reliance became problematic as the Frontier 
Corps lack of effectiveness quickly gave the insurgents a strategic advantage. However, 
by 2003, the Pakistani military was convinced that Al Qaeda and foreign fighters were a 
threat to internal security, and collaborated with U.S. agencies to eliminate the foreign 
threats; however, Islamabad failed to recognize that the insurgent groups such as the 
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Haqqani, and Afghan Taliban were a growing threat.32  
The government’s failure to recognize the impending threat of an insurgency is a 
common oversight as early insurgent acts lack sufficient strength to challenge the 
government;33 therefore, the military’s primary orientation remains toward India.    
                                                 
29Colin S. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History (New 
York: Routledge, 2007), 255. 
30 Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan’s Continued Failure to Adopt a Counterinsurgency Strategy,” CTC 
Sentinel 2 (2009): 8.   
31 Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan’s Worrisome Pullback,” Washington Post, June 6, 2008.  
32 Rashid, Taliban, 225. 
33 David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1964), 9. 
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C. MILITARY EXPENDITURES. 
Pakistan cannot afford to fight a two front war. Pakistan uses its national budget 
for defense spending in an attempt to reach parity with India.34  Geographic proximity, 
the military’s size, and past conflicts create a natural fear of a conventional strike, 
although somewhat reduced with nuclear weapons, but remains a concern as India’s 
military modernizes its conventional capability.35   To date, the Kashmir dispute remains 
unsettled, and continues to be a source of controversy as the Line of Control (LOC) 
remains a de facto state border. Although India has minimally challenged the status quo 
since the original Cease Fire Line (CFL) was established in 1948, Pakistan has overtly 
demonstrated its resolve to annex Kashmir from India as late as 1999 during the Kargil 
War. The Indian political and military leadership’s ability and willingness to act within 
the margins of the nuclear escalation ladder sustains the fear of Indian military aggression 
against Pakistan. 
Pakistan cannot match India’s economic growth and increased military spending. India’s 
aspiration to emerge as a great power creates an asymmetric arms race. Identified almost 
30 years ago, India’s military expenditure behavior has become independent of Pakistan’s 
military expenditure.36  India’s increase in military expenditure has paralleled its 
economic growth. By 2000, increases in Indian GDP and an average 3% military 
expenditure has allowed defense spending to increase four times greater than Pakistan’s 
expenditure (see Tables 1 and 2). According to the 2008 Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) yearbook, India accounted for 80% of South Asia’s military 
expenditure, thereby becoming the largest arms importer in the developing world.37  
                                                 
34 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 42; Reviewing Pakistan’s military expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP since partition, an increase occurred during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars, and 
remained above 5 percent until the 1998 nuclearization period in which expenditures began to contract to 
2.8% by 2008.   
35 Ibid. 
36 Majeksi, S. and D. Jones, “Arms Race Modeling: Causality Analysis and Model Specification,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 25 (1981): 259–288.   
37 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: University Press, 2008), 
194; Siddharth Srivastava, “Indian Arms spree on the Fast Track,” Asia Times, June 4, 2009. 
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During the same period, the Pakistani military budget has contracted, and with 
approximately 75% of peacetime military budgets accounting for salaries, training, 
maintenance, procurement, and operational costs, Pakistan cannot afford to match India’s 
military buildup without severely affecting domestic developmental and welfare 
programs.38 The adoption of a defensive and asymmetric posture has assisted in 
correcting the financial imbalance;39 nevertheless, Pakistan lacks the resources to conduct 
large scale counterinsurgency operations without jeopardizing military readiness along 
the eastern border. 
 
Table 1.   Indian and Pakistan Military Expenditure40 
                                                 
38 Andrew Davies, “Asian Military trends and their implications for Australia,” ASPI Strategic 
Insights, July 2008. 
39 Munir Akram, “Reversing Strategic ‘Shrinkage’,” in Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State,’ ed. 
Maleeha Lodhi (New York, Columbia University Press, 2011), 297. 





























































Table 2.   Indian and Pakistan Gross Domestic Product (GDP)41 
Without jeopardizing its security, the perception of India as the greater threat 
inhibits Pakistan from directing monetary funds toward fighting a counterinsurgency. The 
exogenous shock of the 1990 U.S. sanctions under the Foreign Assistance Act severely 
impeded Pakistan’s military capability to modernize.   The Bush Administration mended 
the U.S.-Pakistani relationship by reversing previous sanctions and re-engaging Pakistan 
in defense cooperation.42 U.S. Arms Sales and Coalition Support Funds provide the 
monies to conduct counterinsurgency operations.  Since 2001, the United States has 
provided approximately U.S.$14 billion through the American security assistance 
program to Pakistan to facilitate troop deployments along the Afghan border, military 
training assistance, and military equipment procurement.43 The establishment of the 
                                                 
41 Data obtained from World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
42 Richard F. Grimmett, “U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan,” Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress (CRS Order Code RS22757), 2008, 2. 
43 Eric Schmitt and Jane Perlez, “U.S. Is Deferring Millions in Pakistani Military Aid,” New York 
Times, July 9, 2011.  
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Coalition Support Funds (CSF) reimburses Pakistan’s logistical and operational efforts in 
support of U.S. operations in Afghanistan.   
Increased U.S. funding has allowed Pakistan to modernize its military. The sale of 
certain military equipment, such as the F-16 Block 52, is criticized as unnecessary for 
counterinsurgency operations, 44 and Pakistan is essentially spending funds on weapon 
systems aimed at combating India.45 Defense planners have the inherent responsibility to 
ensure that their country is protected on all fronts. The purchase of sophisticated weapon 
systems is indicative of a renewed weapons procurement program designed to compete 
against adversarial modern militaries. Although Pakistan has purchased less expensive 
aircraft such as attack helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles more suitable for 
counterinsurgency operations, it has come at the behest of the United States. 
Furthermore, Pakistan’s advancement in naval capability and nuclear delivery platforms 
exhibits a continuing tilt toward an Indian threat.      
D. HONORING THE CONVENTIONAL THREAT 
Indo-Pakistan security competition is a structural problem as state proximity to 
one another is a key variable in interstate conflict.46 Pakistan maintains a preponderance 
of its conventional forces along the eastern border. Both countries demonstrate their 
willingness to enter into conventional conflict under the ‘nuclear umbrella.’ This 
contentious relationship was exacerbated by four large-scale wars and the continued 
territorial dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir.47  Even during the moratorium 
on large-scale military conflict that existed from 1971 thru 1999, limited engagements 
and India’s military posture sustained tensions between the two dyads, and, in fact, it has 
reinforced the Pakistani belief that India is a constant threat to the state.48  Such primacy 
                                                 
44 Gurmeet Kanwal, “U.S. Arms Sales are Propping up Pakistan as a Regional Challenger,” Institute 
for Defense Studies and Analysis, February 11, 2010. 
45 Frederic Grare, Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan: An Action Agenda for the United 
States and Europe (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), 34. 
46 Stephen A. Kocs, “Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945–1987,” The Journal of Politics 57 
(1995): 172. 
47 “The Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia,” 187. 
48 Haqqani, Pakistan,14. 
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places a lopsided military focus with Pakistan’s conventional force poised to defend its 
eastern border against a potential attack from an Indian Army that greatly outnumbers 
and out spends Pakistan.49   
Nuclear weapons have deterred neither Pakistan nor India from conducting low-
intensity conflict. During the 1999 Kargil War, India reduced Pakistan’s nuclear 
deterrence capability by consciously avoiding a full-scale war that would trigger a 
possible nuclear retaliation. With discriminate low-intensity military operations, the 
Indian military was able to roll back the Pakistani army from the Indian-administered 
areas of Kashmir.50 India further demonstrates its willingness to escalate conflicts with 
Pakistan during the Twin Peaks crisis. The crisis was instigated by attacks on the Indian 
parliament buildings in December 2001, and again in May 2002, by alleged Pakistani 
sponsored militants.   In response to the attacks the Indian army mobilized its military to 
its western border.51  Although the conflict was deescalated by political means, Pakistan 
recognized that the nuclear umbrella did not provide protection against India’s military 
capacity. 
Indian security managers recognize impediments to their conventional strategy.   
The civil-military relationship and military mobilization plan was revamped by 
establishing forward staging positions along the Indo-Pakistan border, where armor corps 
could strike with limited warning into Pakistan.52  Indian military leaders determined that 
the three weeks required to coordinate an offensive campaign against Pakistan allowed 
the international community to intervene. Thus, India’s political leaders were pressured 
                                                 
49 Shuja Nawaz, “Pakistan’s Security and the Civil-Military Nexus,” in The Afghanistan-Pakistan 
Theater: Militant Islam, Security, and Stability, ed. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross et al. (Washington, DC: FDD 
Press, 2010), 20. 
50 Jasjit Singh, “The Fourth War,” in Kargil 1999: Pakistan’s Fourth war for Kashmir, ed. Jasjit 
Singh (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999), 128. 
51 Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis 
(Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), 12. 
52 Gurmeet Kanwal, “Lost opportunities in Operation Parakram,” Indian Defense Review, December 
13, 2011. 
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not to carry out retaliatory attacks on Pakistan.53  In fact, Pakistan has consistently relied 
on outside intervention for protection, which is perpetuated by international fear of 
nuclear escalation. The elapsed time also gave the Pakistani army time to redeploy troops 
from the FATA region to the eastern front.54  India realizes the limitations of its current 
military doctrine to rapidly deploy a strike force against Pakistan. Planning began to 
develop an offensive doctrine specifically to act against Pakistan that reduces the 
Pakistani temporal advantage.   
India’s new doctrine, called ‘Cold Start,’ is designed as a high intensity short 
duration armored strike to seize limited swaths of terrain that could be used in post 
conflict negotiations.55 Pakistan can no longer rely on India’s traditional deterrence 
posture and must protect the vulnerable Punjabi plain. Pakistan’s major population 
centers and much of its infrastructure are situated near the Indian frontier, and security 
problems are compounded by a lack of strategic depth. An obstructed Indian Armor 
advance into Pakistan would more than likely require Pakistan to give substantial ground 
before forces could be redeployed to counterattack. With its limited depth, giving up 
ground could be costly; therefore, a similar type catalyst such as the Twin Peaks terrorist 
attacks could incite an Indo-Pakistan war with little warning. A more efficient Indian 
mobilization and limited objective strike plan obligates the Pakistani military to maintain 
a majority of its forces along its eastern border to counter an Indian threat. Pakistani 
regular forces cannot afford to become mired in counterinsurgency operations on the 
opposite side of the country. 
Indian restraint to the 2006 and 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) attacks was a 
significant confidence building step between India and Pakistan. India did not mobilize 
forces against Pakistan; instead, the following illustrates India’s temperament change. 
                                                 
53 Neil Joeck, “The Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Confrontation: Lessons from the Past, Contingencies for 
the Future,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Reigning in the Risk, ed. Henry Sokolski (Carlisle: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2009), 29–30. 
54 Syed Rifaat Hussain, “Battling Militancy,” “The Indian Factor,” in Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis 
State,’ ed. Maleeha Lodhi (New York, Columbia University Press, 2011), 329. 
55 Walter C. Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” 
International Security 32 (2008): 165. 
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One, Indian political leaders looked inward at their internal security failures.56  Two, 
India sought United Nations recourse to pressure Pakistan to enhance anti-terrorist 
policies.57  Three, U.S.-Indian rapprochement slashed barriers to Indian political leaders 
for a quick U.S. diplomatic response,58 and finally, India recognized that Islamabad was 
actively opposing insurgents through counterinsurgency operations. The change in 
posture infused confidence in Rawalpindi decision-makers that their eastern flank can be 
exposed without India retribution. This transition is demonstrated by a 2010 Indian 
Military Intelligence assessment that reported 35% of Pakistani army’s troop strength 
was actively deployed in FATA.59 
E. WILL WASHINGTON ABANDON PAKISTAN? 
Pakistan hesitated to redeploy forces to the Af-Pak border due to uncertainty of 
Washington’s resolve in the region. Pakistan dreaded the possibility of being entrenched 
in a counterinsurgency operation if the United States abandoned the region. Without 
Washington balancing India’s regional hegemony, Islamabad could not afford to leave its 
Eastern border relatively unsecure. Additionally, Pakistani leaders believed that 
insurgency was a result of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, and once the United States 
left, the insurgency problem would be resolved; therefore, decision makers were not 
willing to exhaust resources. 
The U.S.-Pakistan relationship deteriorated prior to 9/11. Material handicaps 
generated by partition impelled Pakistan to enter into a strategic partnership with the 
United States to reduce insecurities toward India while at the same time, Washington 
benefited by anchoring its western flank of Kennan’s containment strategy against the 
Soviet Union.60  Over the years, due to relationship strains and changes in the 
                                                 
56 Angel Rabasa et al., The Lessons of Mumbai, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 15. 
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international environment, this opportunistic relationship has fractured.61  United States 
indifference to the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars and U.S. administrations 
alienation of the subcontinent in favor of pursuing nonproliferation policies caused 
Pakistan to lose confidence.62  Distanced from Pakistan throughout the 1970s, the United 
States and Pakistan rejoined to fight communist adventurism in Afghanistan as the United 
States financed Pakistan to funnel equipment and train forces to counter the Soviet army. 
But as quickly as the U.S. entered the area, they left, leaving Pakistan with a renewed 
civil war next door in Afghanistan. The civil war transformed into an Indian-Pakistan 
proxy war with  Pakistan supporting the Taliban and the Northern Alliance receiving aid 
from India. 63  Moreover, heavy sanctions were placed on Pakistan due to Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) violations, which hollowed U.S.-Pakistan relations and gave a 
sense of U.S. abandonment to the Pakistani leadership.  
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, catapulted Pakistan back onto the 
frontlines of the U.S. war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s alignment with 
the United States was for strategic reasons. President Musharraf feared Pakistan being 
labeled a ‘terrorist’ state, and subsequently an enemy of the United States. However, The 
United States minimal military footprint in Afghanistan signaled to Pakistani leaders that 
Washington was not committed to the region. In 2002, U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan 
reached a maximum of 10,500 and only increased to an average 21,000 military 
personnel prior to 2008. Pakistan took a minimalist approach in supporting U.S. action in 
order to preserve security along its eastern border. The early days of U.S. military 
operations in Afghanistan concentrated on counterterrorism instead of 
counterinsurgency,64  and Washington applied minimal pressure on Pakistan to act 
against the Taliban.65  Washington and Pakistan’s shared objective of capturing or killing 
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of Al Qaeda and foreign fighters allowed for a simple partnership.66  The Pakistani 
government entered into ‘peace deals’ with Islamic insurgent groups and only deployed 
regional forces to counter the Islamic militant groups. The limited objectives created 
perceptions that United States had limited intentions and quickly leave once those 
objectives were accomplished. Furthermore, as the U.S. military diverted resources and 
attention to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) this perception was reinforced.67     
The United States’ change in its Afghan policy signaled to Pakistan a 
strengthened U.S. commitment to the region. From 2002 to 2006, Pakistan did conduct 
counterinsurgency operations in its western territories,68  but a  majority of the security 
forces were members of the Frontier Corps and the only regular forces employed were 
from the XI Corps headquartered in Peshawar. In 2008, President Obama reoriented the 
military operations back to Afghanistan by increasing troop strengths to 98,000 by 2010. 
69  At the same time, Pakistan deployed forces away from the Indian border to participate 
in the Swat Valley Campaigns without fear of retribution from India as U.S.-Indian 
rapprochement facilitated a limited Indo-Pakistan détente.70  Pakistani military forces 
deployed the equivalent of six infantry divisions, which comprised its strike force into 
India, away from the Indian border to counter insurgent threats.71   
F. CONCLUSION 
Although a majority of literature focuses on Pakistan’s “unwillingness” to 
conduct counterinsurgency operations in the Af-Pak border regions, this chapter shows a 
limited capacity for Pakistan to conduct a two front military operation. India is a 
perceived existential threat to Pakistan. Pakistan’s military faces a considerable 
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numerical and material disadvantaged compared to India. The uncertainty of Indian 
intentions created by the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, increased military expenditure, and the 
proximity of India’s military mass transfixes Pakistani security managers on the Indo-
Pakistan Border. Its conventional forces are trained to fight an Indian threat which has 
weakened its counterinsurgency operations. Thus, Pakistan cannot afford to fight a two 
front war without foreign assistance.  
With the absence of conflict resolution and continuing spread of violent actors, 
the prospects of crises remain volatile. Terrorist attacks by non-state actors in 2001 and 
2008 against India illustrate the volatility of Indo-Pakistan relations.  With U.S.-Indian 
rapprochement, India is persuaded to reduce its military posture toward Pakistan, which 
allows Islamabad to expose its eastern borders so military forces can participate in 
counterinsurgency operations.  The United States’ reassertion into the region signals to 
Pakistani leaders that they will not be abandoned. With the Indian threat minimized on 
Pakistan’s eastern border and U.S. aid providing physical capital to sustain military 
operations, Islamabad has renewed military offensive action along the Af-Pak border 
after almost eight years of ambivalence toward insurgent groups. 
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III. A SELECTIVE ISLAMIC AFFINITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I intend to show that Pakistan has not been serious about 
containing Islamic fundamentalists until Islamic militant groups threatened the state. 
Pakistan promoted Islamic fundamentalism to achieve political and geostrategic 
objectives. Washington’s stance on terrorism altered the way Pakistan dealt with Islamic 
groups. Attempts were made by Pakistan to curtail some Islamic groups; however, 
Pakistani leaders accepted groups that continued to align themselves with Islamabad’s 
objectives. President Musharraf used Islamists to consolidate his political power, but at 
the same time worked to appease Washington, which caused resentment within the 
public, military, and government.  Musharraf attempted to balance his domestic agenda 
by appeasing both the United States and religious militant groups.   However, Pakistan’s 
tilt toward the United States, enraged religious militant groups to oppose national forces 
acting in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).72  Domestic affairs made 
circumstances difficult for Islamabad to divorce itself from its former strategy; however, 
the spread of radical fundamental violence changed the government’s orientation toward 
militant groups as the militants began directly challenging the state’s authority.   
B. JIHADI RHETORIC 
Islamic militants are used instrumentally to further Pakistan’s national interests 
specifically in Afghanistan and Kashmir.73 Jihadi rhetoric is a tool used by religious 
extremists to project their version of Islam onto the world hoping to create a pan-Islamic 
Ummah.74  Although Pakistani leaders do not necessarily share pan-Islamic aspirations, 
they identified the manipulative power of jihad to organize groups as a foreign policy 
instrument to achieve strategic objectives. Early examples are indicated during the 
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Kashmiri dispute at partition and 1971 Bangladesh Crisis. At partition, fearing the 
territorial loss of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, tribesmen from the Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa were recruited under the rubric of jihad. These tribal raiders became a 
proxy force to violently coerce the Maharaja Hari Singh to cede the princely state to 
Pakistan. During the 1971 Bangladesh crisis, the Pakistani military used Islamic rhetoric 
and solicited the help of Islamic groups to intimidate East Pakistani secular leaders 
against challenging the West Pakistani political regime.75   
The use of Islamic militant groups expanded during the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet invasion intensified fears of communist expansion. 
General Zia-ul-Haq in collaboration with Washington and Riyadh sponsored militant 
groups to combat Soviet forces.76 The Inter-Service Intelligence’s (ISI) fondness for 
Islamic fundamentalists emerged due to perceptions that they were fearless fighters and 
malleable to Pakistani desires,77 which encouraged the CIA-ISI nexus to funnel military 
aid to radical Islamic parties.78  During this time, the ISI staff expanded from 2,000 to 
40,000 employees and to a billion dollar budget.79 Young Pakistanis and Afghan refugees 
were militarized and indoctrinated into a jihadist culture through a flourishing Madrasa 
network.80  With the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989 and success of the United 
States’ strategic mission, a U.S. exit left Pakistan with a large population of unemployed 
‘freedom fighters.’81 
Recognizing the success of militants against a global hegemon, Islamabad 
pursued a similar asymmetric design against India. Pakistan disputes the accession of 
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Kashmir to India as illegitimate, and it fails to acquire the territory through conventional 
military means. ISI managed extremist groups in the low-intensity conflict against 
India.82  The surplus of ‘freedom fighters’ were funneled into Kashmir to supplement 
indigenous Kashmiri separatist groups compelled to settle the Kashmir dispute in favor of 
Pakistan. Not all separatist groups exhibited an Islamic ideology. Instead initial patronage 
was provided to the secular separatist group Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 
(JKLF) whose radical factions were more determined to act against India. As the 
aspirations of particular separatist groups lost momentum, the ISI would redirect support 
to groups whom were more invigorated to join Kashmir to Pakistan.83  Although many of 
the groups followed an Islamic ideology, Islamabad demonstrated through support of 
multiple militant groups that Islamic ideology was not a requirement, but only an 
instrument to mobilize militant action. 
Pakistan’s continued perseverance in supporting religious militants to advance 
strategic ends was further demonstrated through its patronage toward the Taliban during 
the Afghan civil war. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the changing geopolitical 
situation provided Benazir Bhutto’s government a chance to establish a pro-Islamabad 
Kabul regime that could stabilize the Afghan government, and open up a direct trade 
route with Central Asian Republics (CAR).84  In looking for the best faction to support 
these objectives,  regional expert Frederic Grare summarizes that “In [Pakistan’s] bid to 
control Afghanistan, the army supported in succession two ideologically different 
organizations, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami and the Taliban whose only 
similarity was their Pashtun character.”85  The Taliban is a movement to cleanse society 
and establish a theocratic state and an ulema controlled government that was distinct 
from Hekmatyar’s secular desire for political power.86 Hekmatyar’s inability to 
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consolidate power encouraged the ISI to invest in Mullah Omar’s Taliban.87  
Furthermore, the ISI and the Pakistanis wanted to emphasize the Islamist Afghan side 
over the nationalist Afghan side. Pakistan hoped that a transnational Islamic identity 
would diminish secular Afghan leader’s platform to recapture lost Afghan territory from 
Pakistan.88  For over twenty years, Pakistan used Islamic militant groups as coercive 
tools to promote its foreign policy. 
C. PROSCRIBING MILITANT GROUPS 
Under President Musharraf, Islamic militant groups were proscribed by the 
government; however, the state continued a benevolent attitude. Minimalist policies were 
constructed. State leadership targeted domestic sectarian groups to curb Sunni-Shia 
domestic violence.89   The spread of fundamentalist ideology by Islamic militant groups 
had damaging effects on Pakistani civil society. On August 14, 2001, President 
Musharraf publicly took a stance by proscribing the pro-Sunni Karachi based group, 
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), as a first step to restore domestic stability. The degrading 
effects of Pakistan’s association with the Taliban impelled Musharraf to ban two political 
Islamic groups (Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad) along with additional sectarian 
groups.90 Lenient policies were established based on the presumption that by limiting free 
rein of militant groups, they would eventually wean themselves from jihadi practices.91  
Eventually, some groups did disperse; however, others either found refuge in FATA, or 
joined forces with Al Qaeda and the Taliban.92 
Although Musharraf’s landmark attempt to curtail Islamic militancy within 
Pakistan established a new found precedence against militancy that no prior government 
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had sought to achieve,93 skeptics accuse the Pakistani army and ISI of not being serious 
about eliminating Islamic militant groups.94  Islamabad took no action against 
transnational groups until pressured by the United States.   Even then, in November 2003, 
Musharraf banned fifteen violent sectarian organizations while other similar 
organizations that are useful in Afghanistan and Kashmir were placed on a watch list. 
Additionally, Pakistan’s past use of Islamic militant groups against the existential threat 
of India and the strategic interest of Afghanistan created deep rooted sympathies and 
loyalties that caused the slow implementation of policies. Musharraf’s government made 
a distinction between al Qaeda, foreign fighters, and ‘freedom fighters.’  Although the 
targeting of the two former groups preserved western goodwill, the ‘freedom fighters’ are 
considered Pakistani citizens and useful in both Afghanistan and Kashmir; thus,  
Islamabad is hesitant to act against them.95  
Islamic militant groups began turning against the government as the minimalist 
polices allowed militant groups to continue operating unobstructed. Islamic militant 
group’s regional power and strength increased in the absence of central authority. 96  As 
groups became more emboldened, they began challenging Islamabad. Retribution was 
sought as their increased strength resulted in assassination attempts against political 
leaders. Musharraf faced two unsuccessful assassination plots that materialized from 
Waziristan and included low-level assistance from within the armed forces.97 Fearing a 
Musharraf-Bhutto coalition government set against Islamic fundamentalists, Islamic 
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marking her return to Pakistan.98  The attacks illustrate the violent opposition to 
proscribing policies, but, more importantly, it exhibits the government’s failure to stem 
Islamic militancy. 
D. POLITICAL COLLUSION 
Both military and civilian regimes use Islamic parties to strengthen their political 
base. With Islamic parties carrying extensive clout among the population, political 
leaders learned to bolster their position by gaining Islamic party support. The early use of 
Islamists allowed them to become intertwined within Pakistani political institutions. The 
Islamists mobilizing strength was identified during the Ayub Khan era. Ayub Khan’s 
elitist economic policies and inequitable distribution instigated right-wing mobilization to 
pressure Ayub Khan’s ouster.99  Learning from Ayub Khan’s mistakes, Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto gave Islamist political concessions and promoted a state Islamic ideology. Bhutto 
sought economic equality under the guise of Islamic socialism in an attempt to appease 
Islamic parties. He used the state’s Islamic identity to develop foreign policies with other 
Islamic states. However, Bhutto’s overreliance on a weak Islamic bond could not 
overcome an overwhelming Military-Islamist nexus headed by General Zia al-Huq.100   
Islamists became entrenched under General Zia. Zia’s pious religiosity eased the 
cultivation of Islamist sentiment toward his military regime.101 Collaboration with 
religious groups aided Zia in gaining political legitimacy and allowed Jamat’at-e-Islami 
(JI) to infiltrate into governmental institutions.102   This practice continued with Nawaz 
Sharif, who had explicit ties to JI as head of the Islami Jamhoori Itihad (IJI). Benazir 
Bhutto, former prime minister of the Shia PPP party, even supported the Sunni oriented 
Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (Pakistan Army of the Prophet’s Companions), to bolster her 
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position against the opposition party, Pakistan Muslim League (PML), in the mid-1990s. 
The trend of political leaders using Islamist parties to maneuver against their political 
opposition continues as General Musharraf aligns his King’s party with Mutahidda 
Majles-e-Amal (MMA).103    
President Musharraf’s used the MMA to neutralize its political opposition. “State 
necessity” impelled Chief Justice Irshad Hasan Khan to justify General Musharraf’s 1999 
coup d’etat and gave Musharraf three years to hold democratic elections.104  Musharraf 
saw secular politicians as his primary rival for political power; therefore, he used a 
common political tactic by bolstering his political power through Islamist parties to 
marginalize secular parties.105   The MMA made electoral gains through the redistricting, 
exile of secular political leaders, and electoral concessions.106  Their electoral support 
from Pashtun sympathizers boosted the MMA into power giving them a large minority 
within the national assembly.107  No Islamist political party possessed the organizational 
capacity or popular support necessary to seize power in Islamabad until the 2002 
elections.108    
The MMA’s association with Islamic militant groups and increased power 
allowed the MMA to politically oppose counterinsurgency operations. The MMA 
evolved from the Pak-Afghan Defense council—a conglomeration of religious parties 
opposed to U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and Islamabad’s participation in the “War on 
Terror”—in 2002 to contest the general elections on a common agenda.109  The six 
constituents of the MMA—the J.I., the JUP, the JUI (of Maulana Samiul Haq), the JUI 
(of Fazlur Rahman), the Islami Tehreek Pakistan and the Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith (JAH) —
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have differing ideologies particular toward the Taliban. For example the JI emphasized 
state and legal reform along Islamic lines and supports the Taliban while JUI attempts to 
portray itself as a strictly political movements with little interest in replicating social or 
political aspects of Mullah Omar’s purist Islamist vision.110  Many of the party 
candidates who were elected to the national and state assemblies were former militant 
commanders who fought in Afghanistan and Kashmir. 111 The MMA was now in a 
greater position to influence the assembly and block legislature soliciting adverse action 
against the Islamic militant groups.    
E. THE MILITARY IS NOT MONOLITHIC  
Pakistan inherited a professional and disciplined army trained by the British that 
continues to be a bulwark for national security. Every officer and soldier carries a strong 
sense of commitment and unity to the army,112 which is reinforced by the economic and 
social advantages provided under their loyal service.113 Pakistani army officers do not 
want to see the army turned into a ‘vehicle for religious propagation.’114  The officer 
corps police themselves by purging religious ideologically motivated officers that was 
exemplified by the army chief General Asif Nawaz Janjua’s removal of the ‘bearded’ 
generals.115  General Zia’s attempt to institutionalize the military was met half heartily as 
many followed the rhetoric more to mollify their superior.116   
President Musharraf’s support of Washington’s ‘War on Terror’ was a drastic 
reversal on policy toward militant groups. Many senior generals in the Pakistan army 
understood the reasoning and consequences of joining the United States. Past support of 
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Islamic groups build ties between the military and Islamic groups. Musharraf had to deal 
with the ISI who had closely dealt with the Taliban over the past ten years, and began to 
sympathize with Islamic groups.    Musharraf ordered the dismantlement of the Afghan 
cell, and replaced it with a new Counter Terrorism Cell (CTC) that propagated ISI, FBI 
and CIA collaboration to hunt down al Qaeda fugitives.   In targeting foreign fighters, ISI 
assisted the CIA in operations to remove external actors supporting the insurgency. 
Furthermore, the ISI was purged of officers with extremist sympathies, which was 
demonstrated by the forced resignation of ISI Chief Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed 
and a number of other military commanders regarded as pro-Taliban or Islamist.   
However, the dominance of the ISI prevents a total purge, which allows continued 
support. 
The military was apprehensive of conducting offensive operations against 
Pakistani citizens. Internal state strife pitting citizen against citizen placed Pakistani 
soldiers’ in a moral predicament, as they were forced to choose between family fidelity 
and military service. Personal choice was further complicated when public opinion 
denounced the U.S. led coalition in Afghanistan, identified Musharraf as a U.S. stooge, 
and perceived military combat operations in Pakistan as an ‘American war.’117  As 
religious extremists became more emboldened, they challenged the writ of government, 
forcing the military to act.118   Increased Islamic militant attacks against central authority 
and high casualty rates created animosity between military and extremists.119  With the 
increased violence against the military counterinsurgency operations began to expand.    
As Ahmed Rashid reports, “The Pakistani army has no love for Islamic extremists now, 
but it differentiates between Afghan Taliban, which it sees as a potential ally in a pro-
Pakistan Afghanistan if U.S. efforts there fail, and the Pakistani Taliban, which is viewed 
as a threat to the state to be eliminated.”120   
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F. ISLAMIC GROUPS CHALLENGE THE STATE 
As Islamic militants continued to challenge the central government, their deviant 
behavior brought Islamabad past the breaking point.   The red mosque siege exemplifies 
Islamabad’s resolve against Islamic militants who challenge the state. The mosque once 
received considerable state patronage during the Zia regime. As the state was supporting 
the jihadi movements, the mosque militarized and provided mujahedin recruits to fight in 
the Afghan jihad and later the Kashmiri jihad.121 The mosque’s reputation for radicalism 
attracted hardliners from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.122  Anti-American sentiment fueled 
the mosques influence.   Islamabad’s ambivalence toward the Red Mosque’s leadership 
emboldened radical behavior and promoted sharia law. The Mosque’s leadership 
enforced Islamic standards through violence as they targeted women who chose not to 
wear veils and stores selling music CDs and movie DVDs. Fatwas were issued  that 
labeled Pakistani soldiers killed in the FATA region as U.S. pawns and not worthy of an 
Islamic burial. They kidnapping police officers and held hostage Chinese women 
assumed to be prostitutes serving Pakistani elites. The radical behavior encroached onto 
the government’s rule.    
Musharraf’s regime faced a volatile situation in dealing with the Red Mosque 
dissidents when the fatwas began overstepping onto the central government’s authority. 
123 “”Security forces attempted to peacefully stop the vigilant behavior; however, the 
mosque occupants were uncooperative and barricaded themselves within the mosque 
confines. The standoff between security forces and armed extremists dragged on for four 
months as negotiation attempts were unsuccessful. JI and JUI-F Islamic parties differed 
on their stances. JUI-F acted as a go-between with the central government and mosque 
clerics,124 while JI directly supported mosque leadership and opposed the central 
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government’s position.125  The Musharraf regime was publicly criticized for the inability 
or unwillingness to take effective action, and eventually the situation came to a head. 
After weeks of failed negotiations, “Operation Silence” was launched resulting in the 
death of approximately 100 militants including Pakistani cleric Abdul Rashid Ghazi. The 
event demonstrated the government’s resolve against Islamic militants who challenge the 
state.  
The government’s efforts to stop radical behavior cascaded into bloodshed, which 
redirected militancy against the state. Government agencies were targeted as militants 
began focusing their violent methods against the government, military, and ISI. Many 
Islamic leaders perceived the military action as a compliment to the West’s desire to 
crush Islam. In the fall of 2007, Mehsud announced the formation of the Tehreek-e-
Talibane-Pakistan (TTP, Pakistani Taliban), which is a confederation of several militant 
commanders, and began expanding their operations outside the tribal areas with a severe 
rise in violence in Punjab. 126  There was an increase in suicide bombings and 
ambushes.127 Even the military’s headquarters in Rawalpindi was raided and besieged. 
The Red Mosque was a national and international awaking to the promotion of 
“Talibanization.”128  Until the TTP became a direct threat to the state much of the 
military saw campaigns against Pakistani militants as U.S. bidding against Pakistani 
Muslims.129   
G. CONCLUSION 
History demonstrates Pakistan’s reliance on Islamic militant groups to achieve its 
strategic objectives. The militant’s success prompts Islamabad to maintain an ambivalent 
attitude toward the groups. Although Musharraf attempted to curtail domestic sectarian 
violence, the minimalist approach of proscribing militant groups allowed groups to 
operate unrestrained. Furthermore, Islamic militant groups became entrenched within the 
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Pakistani security and political structures. The use of jihad to mobilize fighters to achieve 
state objectives roots Islamic ideology within Pakistani institutions. Increased political 
recognition embedded Islamists into political institutions, which became pronounced 
during General Zia’s regime. However, President Musharraf further advanced the 
Islamist’s position to stem secular opposition groups. The 2002 elections gave the MMA 
a large minority and a greater ability to affect legislation.  The MMA’s connection to 
Islamic militant influenced their opposition to counterinsurgency operations. 
The Pakistan Army is a secular organization, but it is not a monolithic institution. 
A majority of the officer and soldiers carry a strong sense of commitment and unity to the 
army;130 however, there are pockets of Islamic sympathizers that undermine 
counterinsurgency operations.  Pakistani army officers do not want to see the army turned 
into a “vehicle for religious propagation.”131  The officer corps polices themselves by 
purging religious ideologically motivated officers as exemplified by the Army Chief’s, 
Asif Nawaz Janjua, removal of the bearded Generals.132 Initially, apprehension against 
extremist did occur, as soldiers did not want to fight Pakistani citizens; however, as 
casualty rates increased, that apprehension turned to animosity. By 2008, the military has 
increased its counterinsurgency operations along the Af-Pak border. The Red Mosque 
siege illustrates Islamabad’s reaction against Islamic militants who challenge the state. 
However, unless Pakistani leaders refrain from promoting Islamic ideology to achieve 
political and strategic objectives, radical fundamentalism has the potential to continue 
growing.  
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IV. PASHTUN NATIONALISM POST-9/11 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I intend to demonstrate how Islamabad’s dread of past irredentist 
movements along ethno-linguistic lines of the Pashtun tribes minimized 
counterinsurgency operations and provided political space for insurgents to challenge 
Islamabad’s authority.133   The cohesiveness of Pashtun tribes and the past Pashtun 
nationalistic aspirations has caused Islamabad to proceed cautiously against the Taliban. 
The existing tribal governing system within FATA benefited the insurgents as it allowed 
the charismatic religious leaders to gain legitimacy over the central government agents by 
restoring law and order in the region. Although public opinion initially favored the 
insurgents which repressed military leaders from intervening, the fallout from the 
Taliban’s strict adherence to their religious code and repressive practices changed public 
opinion against the Taliban, which shaped an opening for military intervention. 
B. WHO ARE THE PASHTUNS? 
Estimates suggest that the Pashtuns began inhabiting the Af-Pak border region in 
the 4th century BC with tribal enclaves stretching from the Iranian plateau to the 
Gangetic plains of India.134  In 1747, under Ahmad Shah Durrani, the Pashtun tribal 
factions were consolidated into the present day territories of southern Afghanistan and 
Western Pakistan.135  These tribal enclaves along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region 
are considered the largest segmentary lineage system in the world136 with an estimated 
12.5 million in Afghanistan, approximately 30 million in Pakistan whom are concentrated 
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in Khyper Pahtunkwa, and an additional 3.18 million living in FATA.137  Originally their 
homeland was first identified as “Pakhtunkwa,” or the Pashtun quarter.138  Although the 
Pashtuns only constitute approximately 16% of the total population of Pakistan, they are 
a majority within the northwestern territories of Pakistan. Seven tribal areas and six 
frontier regions divides the 10,507 square miles of the Pakistani state that equates to 
comparing an area equivalent to the size of Vermont.139  The rugged terrain of the FATA 
region is an extension of the Hindu Kush mountain range, and shares a 1240 kilometer 
border with Afghanistan.    
Pashtun tribal organization is a segmented lineage system based on egalitarian 
clans, patrilineal genealogies, and agnatic kinship. Furthermore, the ethno-linguistic 
Pashtun identity is based on a common descent, the Pashto language, and following the 
moral and social code of Pashtunwali.140 Although created from a rural heritage, the 
development of the modern nation-state created a dichotomy in the social construct of the 
Pashtuns; and therefore, Pashtuns are categorized by their affiliation with the state into 
two categories-rural and urban Pashtuns.141  The harsh arid landscape predisposes the 
rural Pashtuns into subsistent agricultural and pastoral living that intensifies 
socioeconomic problems within the tribes. Their basic traditional lifestyle in the 
mountainous regions of FATA and minimal state interaction has left much of the 
inhabitants disenfranchised from the central government. In contrast, urban centers such 
as Peshawar and intrastate migration has integrated Pashtuns into the Punjabi dominated 
social strata. Initial Pashtun incorporation into the state’s jurisdiction began when the 
British Raj formally recognized the two zones and divided the Northwest Territory into 
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two distinct administrated areas – the FATA and PATA.142   Under the British colonial 
frontier crimes regulations (FCR) of 1872, the FATA was managed under a specific set 
of laws that were based on the tribal customs and traditions as the British depended on 
the traditional tribal governance to maintain order and discipline within the region in 
conjunction with brutal retribution from the British military. This autonomous system 
remains today within the FATA region, and preserves the independent ideology of the 
tribal Pashtuns. On the other hand, the urbanization of the region and increased central 
authority has inclined landed elite and entrepreneur to favor modern state politics by 
participating in government institutions and industrialized sectors.143   
History has strengthened the resistive nature and the martial character of rural 
Pashtuns.   The passage of invading armies through Hindu Kush region onward to the 
Indian subcontinent endured great losses at the hands of Pashtun warriors. The 
unrelenting warrior culture combined with the tribal segmented organization facilitates 
the cohesive ability of the tribes to unite under a common banner to mobilize against 
outside conquest.144  Their strong group solidarity is rooted in Pashtunwali, which 
emboldens fighters to die rather than shame themselves by retreating.145  As late as the 
nineteenth century, the British fought two unsuccessful wars and bared considerable 
losses to the ferocity of Pashtun warriors. The cohesive ability and visceral response of 
the Pashtuns tribes to British troop invading the tribal spaces was encountered during the 
frontier disturbances of 1897 when 80,000 tribal Pashtuns went against the garrisons at 
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their traditions causes deep antipathy for any central control. Today, the Taliban 
represents those past jihadi groups and charismatic leaders that fought the British at the 
turn of the century. 147  
C. WHAT IT IS PASHTUN NATIONALISM?  
1. Durand Line 
The lack of unity within Afghanistan permitted the British to expand North 
through India and into present day Pakistan. Fearing Tsarist Empire expansion that could 
bring crisis to the British India economically and strategically, the British unsuccessfully 
attempted twice to expand their control past the Khyber Pass to occupy and subdue the 
region before the signing the Durand Line agreement. The agreement was signed in 1893 
by Amir Abdu Rahman Khan, the monarch of Afghanistan, and Sir Henry Mortimer 
Durand, the Foreign Secretary of British India. With the line stretching from the Wakhan 
corridor to the Persian border (see Figure 1), it has formed the eastern and southern 
borders of modern day Afghanistan, and served British imperialism in two ways. First, 
the British found it more conceivable to alienate the region by conceding control and 
confining Pashtun hostilities within the borders of Afghanistan in lieu of allowing tribal 
factions to interfere with the commerce of British India. Second, the intention of the 
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Figure 3.    Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Regions 
A common occurrence during colonialism was border delineation based on 
geostrategic requirements and less on the social construct of the regions. The demarcation 
of borders along geographic lines ignored the ethnology of the region; therefore 
becoming a major contributor to the tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 
addition to Kabul questioning the legitimacy of the Durand line. The Durand line split the 
Pashtun tribes whom have strong transnational cultural, economic, and political affinities 
overlap into both countries,148 and ignored by borderland Pashtun tribes who view the 
line as illogical from a perspective of regional economics, ethnography, or basic 
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geography.149  Since the inception of the Durand line, controversy over its legality, its 
fragmenting affect, and porous nature has been as political tool for social movements, 
which disrupts Afghan-Pakistan relations.150  Kabul challenges the legitimacy of the 
Durand line and considers it only a de facto border, while Pakistan considers in de jure, 
and thus is concerned with a challenge to the state boundary either organized from a grass 
roots or irredentist standpoint. 
2. Pashtunistan 
The failures of the first and second Anglo-Afghan wars, the strategic nature of the 
Durand line, and tribal resistance to colonial rule prompted the British to institute indirect 
rule to govern the Pashtuns in Northwestern frontier of British India.151  The British’s 
indirect rule took advantage of the already established tribal Maliki System that relied on 
subsidies, or bribes, to facilitate safe passage through the region and to deter general 
malfeasance against the British. However, the subsidies and British regulations began to 
stratify the Pashtun society as large landed elite began to prosper from a land revenue 
system,152 and economically threaten the smaller land owners as they were unable to pay 
taxes.153  In response, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s promoted the non-violent Khudia 
Khidmatgar movement (KKM)154 that materialized in the shadows of India’s anti-





                                                 
149 Jeffery Roberts, The Origin of Conflict in Afghanistan (Westport: Praeger Publisher, 2003), 29. 
150 Rubin, 64. 
151 Adeel Khan, “Pukhtun Ethnic Nationalism: From Separatism to Integrationism,” Asian Ethnicity 4 
(2003): 69. 
152 In 1901, the British established the NWFP. During this time they incorporated Pashtuns into the 
British system through various institutions and implemented a land revenue system. The land revenue 
system created permanent landownership for those Pashtuns whom could afford high tax rates. 
153 Ibid., 78. 
154 A social movement that sought to reunite the Pashtun tribes of British India and Afghanistan in an 
independent state called “Pashtunistan.” 
 45
charisma to efficaciously orchestrate a grassroots movement while British policies 
weaken the KKM top-down through patronizing the elites with land grants and 
subsidies.155 
Fearing Punjabi domination, KKM remerged once again during partition.156  
Pashtun elites isolated from central British India were initially not alarmed by Hindu-
Muslim communal hatreds until riots ensued shifting elites to the Muslim league.157  The 
KKM promoted a plebiscite that included independence and accession to Afghanistan in 
addition the India and Pakistan choices. But, additional choices were considered 
untenable by the British, and once the referendum was final, the KKM acknowledged 
being part of the Pakistan with a redefined agenda seeking provincial autonomy.158    
3. Afghan Factor 
In the past, Afghanistan has supported Pashtunistan ambitions, and Islamabad 
fears that an anti-Islamabad Kabul may incite an irredentist movement.    For Afghan 
rulers, even after the establishment of the Durand line, eastern Pashtuns were still 
claimed to essentially belong to Afghanistan,159 but typically, Kabul’s” Pashtunistan 
policy” were more opportunistic and reactive to political events in Pakistan.160  In 1963, 
Daoud attempted to use the Pashtun repugnance of the “One Unit” plan to re-aggravate 
“Pashtunistan” fears, which resulted in Pakistan closing of the Torkham border and 
transit trade, which inflicted serious economic damage on Afghanistan.161 More 
important, though was the Pashtun tribal responses.   Pakistan Pashtun tribes resisted 
direct Pakistani military support, and instead Pakistani tribes relied on local militias to 
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resist Afghan Pashtuns.162   The resistance demonstrated that if Pashtun tribes were well 
funded and provided autonomy they were not susceptible to separatism and would fight 
against co-ethnic groups, and it displayed their virulent hostiles and cohesiveness to 
oppose outsiders. In both cases, the Pashtuns showed their tacit support of belonging to 
Pakistan.   
In the wake of 9/11 and the emplacement of the Karzai regime, Karzai’s attitude 
on “Pashtunistan” made Islamabad apprehensive about the possibilities of secessionist 
movement. Characteristically, weak leaders seek a solid popular power base among 
divided constituents, by creating a unifying issue in which a consensus can be built.163  
With a Pashtun and non-Pashtun ethnic divide occurring in Afghanistan, Karzai has 
raised the issue on reuniting Pashtuns.164    Conversely, President Musharraf countered 
by pressuring Karzai and Washington to include more Pashtuns into central government 
for fear of a dominating Northern Alliance representation that had substantial ties to 
India, and to minimize “Pashtunistan” aspirations.  Although Pashtuns are too fragmented 
to form a common political front for “Pashtunistan,” the questionable policies of Kabul 
on the “Pashtunistan” issue are a sensitive matter for Islamabad, and Pakistan may 
continue to curtail any military activity that may provoke Pashtun unrest and give a 
Kabul an advantage. 165   
D. FAILED GOVERNANCE 
KP and FATA are governed by two distinct systems. FATA maintains semblance 
of the British FCR as Pakistan’s central government was too poor and preoccupied with 
India during the early years of partition and adopted a less intrusive policy by granting 
more local autonomy.166  In KP, the elites were persuaded by political modernity to enter 
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conventional democratic politics.167  Although both areas are predominately Pashtun, 
they have either integrated or isolated themselves from the central government, and in the 
case of FATA, it has been problematic for Islamabad. 
Like the British, Islamabad utilized the same local hierarchy to administer control 
over the tribal region. By doing so, it allowed a loose political system of tribal autonomy 
in which Islamabad could still maintain minimal legal jurisdiction.168  The organizational 
and power sharing structure is triangular relationship between the tribal leadership, 
religious establishment, and government representative with the two former guided by 
Pashtunwali and the government official taking orders from Islamabad via the provincial 
governor. Typically, government representatives would establish policies within the tribal 
areas by distributing subsidies, or bribes, which in turn would bring compliance. 
Traditionally, the mullah had minimal authority except for dispute resolution and 
religion.169  The system worked for many decades because of the financial incentives 
distributed by the state through the Maliks.   However, local hierarchies of rural and tribal 
society began to erode during the Afghan Civil war as radical clergy were enlisted to lead 
the state sponsor of jihad, which elevated the mullah’s position.170  The military often 
chose mullahs over traditional leaders whom had a tendency to be more inclined to enlist 
in Pashtun nationalist causes to mobilize fighters against the Soviet army.171  
Additionally, the infusion of Saudi money, and the flourishing madrassa system further 
advanced the religious leaders position and challenged the Malik financial clout.172   
Not until the enemy-centric approach of the military against the Taliban in 2002 
did the Tribal governance triad fail. Although hesitant to take military action within its 
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own borders, Islamabad became immersed in an unavoidable situation as the changing 
international context against terrorism and Washington’s insistence constrained 
Islamabad into taking a military action.   Unfortunately, the military incursion 
undermined the influence of the political agents, and created political space for a growing 
youth opposition to tribal governance system whom perceived the old system as a 
restraint to entrepreneur aspirations.173  Two key factors created the political space for 
pro-Taliban militants in the guise of religious leaders to enter.174  First, isolation and 
disregard by Islamabad led to a decaying socioeconomic infrastructure and second, the 
absence of an influential tribal governance system, which led to anarchical situation 
within the tribal regions. As the local Taliban asserted their authority, curtailed violence, 
and brought law and order to the tribes, positive popular opinion toward the Taliban 
precluded continuing military action for fear of sparking tribal revolt.175 
E. CONTAINING THE THREAT 
Following the U.S. invasion in October 2001, thousands of Taliban fighters 
including Pashtun and foreign fighters have found sanctuary in FATA and in some parts 
of the Khyper Pahtunkwa. The porous nature of the Durand line continues to concede 
western Pakistan as an extension of Afghan territory that permits the Taliban sanctuary 
within Pashtun dominated area.176   Beginning in 2002, at behest of Washington, military 
campaigns into the FATA have met fierce resistance and demonstrated the Pashtun 
resolve to counter military incursions into the tribal areas reinforcing segmented politics 
of uniting against common outside force. 177   Pakistani authorities worried that further 
incursion into FATA may transform the Taliban movements into a Pashtun nationalist 
movement.178  Public support was also in favor of the Taliban as the United States drone 
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attacks and killing of fellow Pashtuns fueled anti-American sentiment.179  Additionally, 
the military already faced an internal insurgency in the adjacent province of Baluchistan, 
and did not want to instigate further hostilities in the country. Faced with a potential 
cascading internal security dilemma over past irredentist movements along ethno-
linguistic lines of the Pashtun tribes, Islamabad minimized offense operations, and 
instead attempted to contain Pashtun sympathies toward the Taliban with appeasement. 
F. TALIBANIZATION 
David Galula, an expert in counterinsurgency, found that counterinsurgent 
himself tends to inadvertently protect insurgent by failing to properly access the potential 
threat and therefore ignoring or misjudging the problem.180   As Joshua White explains, 
the Pakistani government has been susceptible to same situation along the eastern border 
as they watched insurgents take root in small regions, and they have done very little in 
terms of forceful resistance until the problem became dire.181  Typically, the military has 
come down heavy handed with an enemy-centric approach with their search-and-destroy 
missions and air strikes, which often kill innocent villagers, which strengthened the anti-
government movements.182    
The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal’s (MMA) willingness to politically block 
counterinsurgency campaigns provided the Taliban the free space to establish networks, 
and allow spread of the Talibanization.183  Talibanization is defined as a social 
phenomenon that uses Islamist doctrines, ideologies, and values to achieve desired 
goals.184  Pakistan Taliban sought to impose Sharia law throughout the FATA region. 
The appeasement policies and public support for the Taliban contributed to the spread, as 
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militant groups became more embolden by a weak central government who seemed more 
than willing to concede as long as activities remained confined within FATA. The 
predatory tactics of the Taliban alienated the inhabitants of the tribal areas. Positive 
public opinion has shifted away from militants as their violent tendencies and criminal 
activity has changed their image from “provider of justice” to “thug.”185  The militants 
within FATA and neighboring areas of KP have mirrored organized crime syndicates in 
both organizational structure and behavior.186  No longer constrained by negative public 
opinion, Islamabad became more at ease to confront the Pashtun militants. The Pakistani 
government acknowledged the growing threat of Talibanization toward the state,187 and 
launched repeated attacks into the tribal areas where state authority was overtly 
challenged.188  Unfortunately, Islamabad’s delay and heavy handed tactics resulted in 
two million internally displaced people (IPD). The government was not prepared for the 
refuge problem, which once again allowed space for militant groups to act. The local 
Taliban began building charity camps showing that the militants were in a better position 
to take care of the population than the government. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The British’s limited exercise of bureaucratic control endorsed tribal autonomy, 
which continued after partition with Islamabad’s neglect of the frontier regions due to the 
weak nature of the central government.189  Along the Western Border, aspirations of the 
Khudia Khidmatgar movement calling for the separate state of “Pashtunistan” continue to 
exist, and are further agitated by the Kabul regimes as a political tactic to garner Pashtun 
support. With the majority of the Pashtuns integrated into the modern society, it’s the 3 
million rural Pashtuns of the FATA region that Islamabad dreads. Prior to the 9/11, the 
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inhabitants of the FATA region existed undisturbed from the reach of Islamabad, and 
relished in their autonomy. Nevertheless, the context of center-state relations dramatically 
changed as the United States focused on the Taliban-Al Qaeda nexus. 
As the Afghanistan war extended into the tribal regions of Western Pakistan, 
Washington has pressured Islamabad to act against insurgents to deny access to the 
unmonitored terrain. Pakistani political and military leader were apprehensive to conduct 
attacks against fellow Pakistani, but the cohesive and visceral character of the Pashtuns 
served as a deterrent against military actions. For the first time in 2002, military forces 
enter the FATA region to deny insurgents a sanctuary from U.S. forces, and met 
substantial resistance that predicated signing peace deals to prevent further military 
causalities. With the Taliban operating without restraint, they were able to fill the 
political vacuum and bring a sense of stability to the region. Embolden by their triumphs, 
they embellished their control and turned positive popular support into negative. With 
new popular inspiration for military intervention to remove the Taliban, Pakistani 
leader’s anxieties of separatist movement sparked by a Punjabi dominant army have been 
reduced. Unfortunately, the heavy handed tactics of the Pakistani Army have contributed 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. AN INDIAN NEIGHBOR 
Pakistan faces a growing insurgency problem.  Events inside Afghanistan pushed 
insurgents into the ungoverned areas of western Pakistan.  Washington alleges that 
Pakistan is supporting insurgents by preserving safe havens for organizing and launching 
attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan to destabilize a pro-Indian Kabul regime.  
Critics are quick to surmise that Pakistan is acting in a dubious manner against U.S. 
intentions in Afghanistan, and Islamabad has done little to thwart insurgency within its 
borders.  However, critics fail to realize the complexity of Pakistan’s security 
environment and disregard the traditional Indo-Pakistan conventional rivalry.   
Animosity between India and Pakistan was shaped by the events of partition.  
Four conventional wars precipitated in their relative short history.  India’s intervention 
into Pakistan’s 1971 civil war, which resulted in the secession of East Pakistan, 
entrenched the perceived Indian threat.  Cold war politics further polarized their 
relationship as each country aligned with opposite global hegemonic states.  The 1998 
nuclearization of India, which Pakistan followed two weeks later, reflects the security 
concerns that Pakistan draws from India’s military posture.  Moreover, the sharing of an 
1800 mile border that remains partially contested forms a structural problem for both 
states to endure. 
The Indian military along the Pakistani eastern border has affected Islamabad’s 
commitment to counterinsurgency operations along the Af-Pak border.  The existential 
threat of India has primacy in Pakistani security calculations, and planners must ensure 
protection against any potential Indian aggression.  However, India’s military restraint 
after the 2008 Mumbai attacks placed confidence into Pakistan’s policy makers that 
eastern border protection could be relaxed without jeopardizing security.  Although 
Pakistan did recognize the insurgent threat along its western borders, security managers 
must not only balance force deployments, but resource allocations, as well, to ensure 
security is not jeopardized on either front.    At the same time, Pakistan must be confident 
that the United States’ resolve in the region will be steadfast in order to minimize fears of 
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possible U.S. abandonment, which would leave Pakistan vulnerable to Indian regional 
hegemony.  Without Indo-Pakistan rapprochement or a change in threat prioritization, 
Pakistani military training, expenditure, and deployments will be made in regards to 
India.   
B. ISLAMIC AFFINITY 
The political and military links to Islamist extremism were formed through 
instrumental means to achieve political and geostrategic objectives and not a state 
fundamentalist ideology.  Islamic militants were used as tools to shape foreign policy to 
further Pakistan’s national interests specifically in Afghanistan and Kashmir.190  
President Musharraf’s used Islamist parties to consolidate political power, while at the 
same time distancing himself from his military base.   Additionally, he tried to balance 
his domestic agenda with the right wing, while at the same time working to appease 
Washington, which caused resentment within the public, military, and government.   
Furthermore, the U.S.-Pakistani union, invigorated religious groups to oppose to national 
forces acting in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).191   Domestic affairs 
made circumstances difficult for Islamabad to divorce itself from its former strategy; 
however, the spread of radical fundamental violence changed the government’s 
orientation toward militant groups as the militants began directly challenging the state’s 
authority.   
Pakistan’s geostrategic position in relation to Afghanistan made it a ‘frontline’ 
state in the United States “War on Terror” 192 while Al Qaeda’s pan-Islamic ideology, 
fundamentalist nature and connection to the Taliban brought a religious element to the 
conflict.  With Pakistan sharing an Islamic identity with the militant groups operating in 
the northwestern territories and the state’s ineffectiveness to curtail their violent actions, 
doubts were cast on Islamabad’s fidelity to Washington.   Historical examples 
demonstrate the capability of Pakistani secular elites to manipulate Islamic ideology to 
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aid in achieving national interests.193  The Pakistani military’s promotion of jihad has 
shown to be a viable tactic.  However, the events of 9/11 changed the way the world 
viewed terrorists and the states that harbor them. Islamabad’s patronage toward militant 
groups was quickly severed, but sympathies within the ranks made it hard to make a 
clean break from Islamic militant groups.   
Historically, political elites used Islamists to bolster their political position against 
the opposition, and Musharraf was no different.  The MMA’s electoral gains were an 
unprecedented political outcome that gave Islamists an influential path into Islamabad’s 
decision-making process against the insurgency.  But, as Islamic zealots began 
threatening the state’s central authority, the Pakistani Military renewed its efforts to 
curtail Islamic fundamentalist activity.   At the policy level the military and the secular 
political elite are operating against the religious groups in Pakistan; however, support is 
still provided due to deep-rooted sympathies, anti-American sentiment, and regional 
affinities rather than religious affinities.194  
C. PASHTUN NATIONALISM 
Pashtun nationalism emerged in the 1930s as part of the anti-colonial movement 
in British India.  Landed elites faced off against landless laborers, who were led by Khan 
Abdul Ghaffar Khan.  The Khan’s Khudia Khidmatgar movement (KKM) promoted the 
reunion of the Pashtun tribes of British India and Afghanistan first in 1930 in opposition 
to the British rule and once again during partition,195 as an independent nation called 
“Pashtunistan.”   In addition, Kabul exacerbated Pakistani fears by challenging the 
legitimacy of the Durand line and the denial to recognize Pakistan within the United 
Nations in 1947.196  Throughout the twentieth century, Kabul’s non-consistent policies 
toward the Pashtun ethnic groups inhabiting the Afghanistan-Pakistani border region 
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concerned Islamabad;197 therefore, after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, Islamabad 
chose to align itself with the Taliban during the Afghan civil war.  Pakistan sought an 
Islamabad friendly Kabul regime that would meet Pakistan’s strategic requirements and 
oppose Pashtun nationalist goals.198  Unfortunately for Islamabad, that alliance was short 
lived as the context of the international environment changed, and the Taliban-Al Qaeda 
nexus was the focal point of the United States’  “War on Terror.”  President Musharraf’s 
reversal on terrorist policies had potential implications to reenergizing ethnic Pashtun 
tensions as the Taliban are considered one the same with Pashtun ethnicity.199   
Shared ethnic and tribal ties and little disregard for the Af-Pak border allowed for 
Taliban to use the FATA territory as a safe haven and launching point against ISAF’s 
military campaign within Afghanistan making the Pashtun-dominated areas of western 
Pakistan an extension of Afghan territory.200  Washington failed to understand the ethnic 
context of the Af-Pak region, and it continued to increase pressure on Islamabad to 
prevent the Taliban’s regional occupation.  The Pakistani government was sensitive to a 
possible Pashtun self-determination movement possibly sparked by an invading Punjabi 
dominated army.201  From Alexander the Great to the British Raj, history has 
demonstrated that Pashtun tribes have had a strong aversion to invading armies.  With 
75% of military personnel from the Punjabi region, the ethnic disparity within the army 
could portray the Pakistani forces as an occupying army.  This is also tied to Pashtuns 
strong sense of governmental autonomy within the FATA region.  As well, anti-
American sentiment was rabid throughout the region because of U.S. and NATO 
operations against Pashtuns in Afghanistan resulting in Islamabad losing a significant 
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amount of influence in the tribal regions,202 and local Taliban groups became more 
poised to challenge Islamabad. 
The cohesiveness of Pashtun tribes and the past Pashtun nationalistic aspirations 
has caused Islamabad to proceed cautiously against the Taliban.  Islamabad feared past 
irredentist movements along ethno-linguistic lines of the Pashtun tribes; therefore, the 
military conducted limited counterinsurgency operations.  With minimal central 
government opposition, insurgents had the freedom to build their popular support base.  
The charismatic religious leaders tilted the existing tribal governing system within FATA 
in their favor by restoring law and order in the region.  Locals favored the renewed 
regional stability.  But, eventually the fallout from the Taliban’s strict adherence to their 
religious code and repressive practices changed public opinion against the Taliban, which 
created an opening for military intervention.               
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